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THE STATUS OF SOVEREIGN TRIBAL IMMUNITY
OF AMERICAN INDIANS
Let me be a free man, free to travel, free to stop, free to choose
my own teachers, free to follow the religion of my fathers, free
to talk, think and act for myself - and I will obey every law or
submit to the penalty.
-- Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce, 18781
An American Indian tribe is immune from suit in any court unless the
Congress has expressly consented to the suit. 2 The tribe is considered
a dependent sovereign nation, subject to the plenary powers of Con-
gress.3 This principle was reaffirmed as recently as 1967 by the Eighth
Circuit in Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe.4 Twin Cities involved an attempt to invalidate a tribal election,
held pursuant to the provisions of Section 16 of the Federal Indian
Reorganization Act5 for the purpose of amending a tribal constitution
and by-laws. The Court denied that there was federal question jurisdic-
tion under either the F.I.R.A. or under 28 U.S.C. §1331, by noting that
This argument overlooks defendant Minnesota Chippewa Tribe's
sovereign immunity, protecting it from suit in the federal courts.
Indian tribes under the tutelage of the United States are not sub-
ject to suit without the consent of Congress . . . and 28 U.S.C. §1331,
28 F.C.A. §1331 does not operate to waive sovereign immunity...6
The Federal Indian Reorganization Act provides the authority and
procedures by which an Indian tribe may organize itself and adopt a
constitution and by-laws for the purpose of formulating a tribal govern-
ment. In Twin Cities Chippewa, plaintiffs challenged the validity of a
tribal constitutional amendment adopted and approved under authority
granted by tribal and Federal law. The objective of the suit was to fore-
stall implementation of tribal amendments which had been approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, following ratification by tribal members.
The amendment had been approved originally pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§2
and 9, and regulations made thereunder, and not under the F.I.R.A., as
plaintiff had alleged.
Most Indian tribes have reorganized their governments under the
F.I.R.A. However, there are still some tribes which have not exercised
their option to reformulate their governments under the act. Merely
because the Indian Reorganization Act is not involved, there is no
reason for a different result on the immunity issue. In Green v. Wilson,
7
the Ninth Circuit held that a tribe was immune from suit, in an action
1. Joseph. "On Indians' Views of Indian Affairs." 128 N. Amer. Rev. 412, 433 (1879).
2. See e.g. United States v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co:, 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940);
Halie v. Saunoole. 246 F. 2d 293. 298 (4 Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 893 (1957);
Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372 (8 Cir. 1895).
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
4. 370 F. 2d 529 (8 Cir. 1957).
5. 48 Stat. 984 (1934), 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.
S. 370 F. 2d at 532.
7. 331 F. 2d 769 (9 Cir. 1964).
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arising out of a tribal constitution adopted and approved only under the
authority granted in 25 U.S.C. §2 and subsidiary regulations. Thus, the
Courts have recognized the sovereign immunity of non-I.R.A. tribes as
well as of I.R.A. tribes in such suits. Nor can the United States be
made a party in such cases, since the Congress would not ordinarily
have consented to suit against the United States either in the Federal
Indian Reorganization Act or in the Administrative Procedure Act.8
The Indian Civil Rights Act9 is as silent on jurisdictional questionsO
as is the F.I.R.A. Enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act does not
constitute the consent of Congress to sue an Indian tribe. The impact of
the passage of the Act on the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit has
now been considered in two federal district court cases, Pinnow v.
Shoshone Tribal Council1 and Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Indian Reser-
vation.
12
The Pinnow case involved tribal enrollment procedures, whereby a
child born of an Indian couple would be "enrolled" in the father's tribe
so that the child might in the future have a right to a voice in tribal
government. The Pinnow plaintiffs alleged violations of the Indian
Civil Rights Act by the defendant tribes in their enrollment procedures,
and plaintiffs sought an order to direct the institution and implementa-
tion of new enrollment ordinances. The district court dismissed the case
for want of jurisdiction, concluding:
The controversies involved herein are matters solely within the in-
ternal governments of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. Internal
matters of tribal government are not within the bounds of federal
jurisdiction unless jurisdiction is expressly conferred by Congressional
enactment. There is no express provision providing for federal juris-
diction in 25 U.S.C. §1303, giving the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to any person to test the legality of detention by order of any
Indian tribe. In the absence of express Congressional authority con-
ferring jurisdiction in the federal courts, this Court must refrain from
assuming jurisdiction where it has none. In view of the immunity of
Indian tribes from suit and the absence of a substantial federal ques-
tion, this Court cannot assume jurisdiction.18
The Congress has provided by statute and regulations the means for
amending tribal constitutions and has conferred upon the Secretary of
the Interior a supervisory authority over the amending process. The Fed-
eral courts, however, have no such duty to oversee these procedures.
On the other hand, in Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe,14 the court
concluded that it had jurisdiction over the defendant tribe in a suit to
enforce rights assured under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Spotted
Eagle court held that in addition to the qualification of tribal immunity
S. 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 5 U.S.C. §1001 et. seq. See also Motah v. United States, 401 F. 2d
1 (10 Cir. 1968).
9. 82 Stat. 77 (1968). 25 U.S.C. §1301 et seq.
10. With the exception of granting jurisdiction in the federal courts in seeking writs of
habeas corpus to test the legality of detention by an Indian tribe. See 25 U.S.C. §1303.
11. 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970).
12. 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969).
13. 314 F. Supp. at 1160.
14. Suprl.
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expressly provided in the habeas corpus provision, the Indian Civil Rights
Act, together with 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) l r constituted, in effect, Con-
gressional consent to suit against certain tribal actions mentioned in the
act. The court concluded that it did, therefore, have "equitable jurisdic-
tion over the tribe and over its officers,"' 1 since the act affords rights
which may be protected by the Federal district courts.17 While the court
noted that the opinion "intimates nothing with respect to the doctrine
of judicial immunity, nor official immunity from suit,"'18 neither did it
suggest that its jurisdiction over the tribal defendant was limited by the
doctrine of immunity. The court did not expressly hold that the Indian
Civil Rights Act, together with 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) constituted Congres-
sional consent to suit against Indian tribes in civil rights actions. Indeed,
the court may have overlooked, like the plaintiffs in Twin Cities Chip-
pewa, the doctrine of tribal immunity and proceeded from reasoning
which established jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the
federally protected rights of the plaintiffs. Evidently this reasoning
compelled the court to conclude that it had personam jurisdiction over
the defendant tribe.
If Spotted Eagle stands for the proposition that enactment of the
1968 Civil Rights Act constituted Congressional consent to suit because
of a presently existing jurisdictional statute containing no reference to
Indian tribes, then it clearly departed from the customary rule of con-
struing doubtful language consenting to suit in favor of the defendant
tribes.19 The court in Spotted Eagle relied on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. 2 0 and Bell v. Hood,2 1 both cases which involved neither Indian
tribes nor the concept of sovereign immunity. In addition, the court
disregarded cases which held that 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) deals solely with
subject matter jurisdiction and not with personal jurisdiction.22
Sovereign immunity applies where the effect of the judgment sought
would interfere with public administration or would have the effect of
restraining the sovereign from acting or would compel it t. act.2 3 It
thus prevents suit where the sovereign is the real party in interest, al-
though only individual officers of a tribe are named as defendants. It
does not merely bar naming the sovereign as a defendant. It is the
essential nature of the suit and the relief sought which determines
whether the doctrine is applicable, not the identity of the defendants.
In State of Hawaiiiv. Gordon,24 the Supreme Court stated the relevant
rule: "[R] elief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against
15. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person . . . to recover damages or to secure equitable or other
relief under any Act of Congress providing for protection of civil rights, including the
right to vote .. "
16. 301 F. Supp. at 91.
17. See note 15, supm
1& 301 F. Supp. at 91.
19. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens National Bank, 361 F. 2d 517, 521 (5 Cir. 1966),
cert. den. 385 U.S. 918 (1966).
20. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
21. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
22. Smith v. Elilngton, 348 F. 2d 1021 (6 Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 998, reb. den. 383
U.S. 954.
23. Land v. Dollar 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947).
24. 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter." 25
It is true that in two decisions involving forcible exclusion of a non-
Indian from Indian land by tribal officers and agents a court has taken
jurisdiction.26 There is no indication in either of these cases, however,
that the court addressed itself to the possibility that tribal immunity
might shield a tribal chairman and other tribal employees from suit
notwithstanding the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. It does not appear in either opinion that tribal immunity was as-
serted by the defendant chairman although he was represented by attor-
neys for his tribe.
Furthermore, in Nakai II the court held that the acts of tribal officers
and employees were without lawful authority, being based on unlawful
orders of the tribal advisory committee which failed to conform to the
tribe's legal code, and was moreover an unlawful bill of attainder under
the Indian Civil Rights Act. 27 A well-established exception to sovereign
tribal immunity is that an officer of the sovereign can be sued if he acts
outside the scope of his statutory powers or if his powers are constitu-
tionally void.28 This is limited by the rule that immunity from suit
protects an official who commits a tort while acting within the scope of
his lawful authority.29 The relief sought by the plaintiff in Nakai I and
Nakai II was an injunction and damages against the named defendants.
It appears that the court, or the tribal attorneys, simply overlooked the
sovereign immunity of the Navajo Tribe from suit without Congressional
consent.
Enoch LaPointe*
*Member, Notre Dame Legal Aid and Defender Society, Indian Affairs Section.
25. ILd. at 58.
26. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968) [hereinafter referred to as "Nakai I'];
Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as "Nakai I"].
27. 298 F. Supp. at 34.
28. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 622 (1963).
29. Davis v. Littell, 398 F. 2d 83 (9 Cir. 1968). cert. den. 393 U.S. 1018 (tribal immunity
to suit extends to official of tribe acting within scope of authority).
